The Court of Appeal held that Coastal Rescue Officers (CROs) had legal rights as “workers”, despite being called volunteers. For many of their activities they had the right to claim remuneration (not just expenses), if they chose to do so. The court held that legally, on each call-out there was a contract under which they agreed to perform services. Although the court did not consider the Equality Act 2010 (EqA), this should mean they have rights under the EqA.
[2026] EWCA Civ 6, Court of Appeal. Full decision: www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/6.html
Facts
The claimant was a Coastal Rescue Officer (CRO). CROs were described as volunteers.
The relevant documents on the relationship of CROs with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) were a “Volunteer Handbook”, a Code of Conduct, and a document which included details on “Remuneration claims”. The latter document had separate sections for “Expense Claims. As regards remuneration claims, CROs could if they wished claim an hourly rate for certain activities, although some chose not to (§§8-19). The activities for they could not claim were of only peripheral importance (§39).
The issue was whether the claimant was entitled to be accompanied by a member of his trade union, the GMB, at a ‘Challenge Meeting’ (an appeal hearing), when MCA terminated his position as a CRO. He claimed to have the right to be accompanied under s.10 Employment Relations Act 1999, which required that he be a “worker” within s.230(3) Employment Rights Act 1996. He argued that he was a “limb (b)” worker.
[The same test (below) should apply to whether someone can claim under the Equality Act.]
Held by the Court of Appeal: The claimant was a worker, despite the documents calling him a volunteer.
Court of Appeal decision
So far as there was any difference between the two main judgments, Popplewell LJ perferred that of Stuart-Smith LJ, so I focus here on that.
The issue
The Supreme Court in Uber had summarised the elements of the statutory definition in s.230((3)(b) as being “(1) a contract whereby an individual undertakes to perform work or services for the other party; (2) an undertaking to do the work or perform the services personally; and (3) a requirement that the other party to the contract is not a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.” In this case, only (1) was disputed. It was clear that if there was a contract to perform services for MCA, it was to perform the services “personally” (2), and clear too that MRC was not a customer etc of a business carried on by the claimant (3). (§§50-51)
The Court of Appeal focused on whether the claimant was a worker each time he undertook an activity with the MCA. The court did not consider whether there was an “umbrella contract” which had continuing effect between call-outs, due to the way the case was put before the employment tribunal below. (§24, §37)
Was there a contract?
To be a “contract” (requirement (1) above) there must be an intention to create legal relations. The Court of Appeal said it could not be argued there was no such intention here. If there were no such intention, then if – on the CRO claiming the financial recompense outlined in the MCA’s documentation – the MCA refused to pay it, the CRO would have no legally enforceable right to claim it. The documents clearly implied that a CRO making a claim in accordance with them was entitled to be paid. (§§57-59)
Was it a contract “to perform work or services”?
The Court of Appeal held yes it was.
The MCA put out a call for volunteers to attend to deal with an emergency. CROs could choose to respond, and if more responded than were required the MCA could choose which CROs to take.
For those CROs chosen, there was an intention to create legal relations (above) and an agreement pursuant to which the CRO undertook to do the work or perform the services, in consideration of which the MCA agreed to pay the CRO at the rates previously agreed. So there was a contract satisfying the requirements of s.230(3)(b), and the CRO was a “worker”. (§§60-61)
The Court of Appeal added:
61. … I would reject the submission that analyses the agreement between the parties as an “if” agreement (“If you walk to York, I will pay you £100”), though I see no compelling reason why, in suitable circumstances, a unilateral “if” contract should not satisfy the terms of section 230(3)(b). …
It did not matter if the claimant could subsequently cancel the contract:
62. The underlying nature of the agreement between the parties is not affected if either party is entitled subsequently to cancel it… . It is therefore not necessary to decide whether, on a proper construction of the agreement, the CRO who changes their mind half way down the cliff is entitled to do so. However, if it were necessary I would reject the submission that the CRO can bale out whenever it takes their fancy to do so. To my mind such an outcome is inconsistent with (a) the safety-critical nature of the enterprise and (b) the CRO’s agreement to comply with reasonable requests. …
Throughout the hearing it had become increasingly difficult to understand how the MCA’s barrister sought to distinguish this case from Uber. When pressed, the only point of distinction he was able to suggest was that, once an Uber driver accepts a passenger, they are bound to complete the journey. For the reasons just given, the Court of Appeal did not accept that Uber could be distinguished even on that limited basis. (§63)
Unremunerated activities
The court left open whether the same applied to non-remunerated activities of CROs (§39). [This is stated in Bean LJ’s judgment, but also seems implicit in that of Stuart-Smith LJ.]
My comments
Same test as EqA
The test for whether someone is a “worker” within s.230(3) Employment Rights Act 1996 should be the same as the test for whether they are an “employee” within the Equality Act 2010 (EqA): see Employees, workers and beyond>Definition of “worker”, including Technical note: statutory definitions of “worker” which discusses s.230(3).
So this decision should mean that CROs can claim under the EqA.
I discuss this case in the context of volunteers on Volunteers and interns>Legal contract to do work.
How far does the decision go?
To an extent, each case will depend on its own facts.
However, the Court of Appeal saw it as not necessarily inconsistent with being a “worker” that the person could decide to leave part way through the particular job.
The MCA’s remuneration document described the payments here as “compensation for any disruption to your personal life and employment”. Bean LJ in the Court of Appeal said that payment in compensation for interference with a person’s use of their time is the essence of remuneration (§41). A court is likely to be suspicious of “creative” ways to describe payments (other than for expenses), to try to make them sound as if they are not remuneration or salary.
Reimbursement of expenses such as travel is not sufficient to make someone a worker. (§41)
It was undisputed here that the services were to be performed “personally”, and that the MRC was not a customer or client of a business carried on by the CRO.
In the Employment Appeal Tribunal (bailii.org), it was accepted the legal position of volunteer Station Officers (SOs) was the same as for CROs. Indeed the EAT (§6) said the claimant was an SO from 2011.
If no right to remuneration (other than expenses)
There needs to be a contract to perform work personally, other than as an independent business (Employees, workers and beyond>Definition of “worker”). Presumably, for this, there need not necessarily be a right to remuneration in money, if the employer gives some other consideration – ie something else in return – and there is an intention to create legal relations. Consideration, and such an intention, are among the requirements for a valid contract in England and Wales (it may differ in Scotland). An extremely basic guide to the requirements for a contract in England and Wales is What is contract law? (law.ac.uk).
However, cases where there is no remuneration in money may well be strongly contested by the alleged employer, and may get very technical. Also the Court of Appeal did say in the present case:
56. … Conversely, the absence of payment [of remuneration] is likely to be a striking indicator that a person is a “pure” volunteer and not a “worker”: the fact that a person provides their services voluntarily and without payment supports the conclusion that they are consequently entitled to withhold their services with impunity … .
Link on my website
External links
- Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Martin Groom (oldsquare.co.uk), 15 Jan 2026
- HM Coastguard keep worker status after court ruling (gmb.org.uk), 14 Jan 2026
- It was previously reported that following this ruling, Coastguard Rescue Officers would no longer be paid for emergency call-outs. However, now: Government drops plans to stop paying Coastguard volunteers (bbc.co.uk), July 2026.
