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Harassment of employees

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Last updated 23rd October, 2026.

The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) specifically covers disability-related harassment at work, including by managers or colleagues.

Summary

EHRC technical guidance, 2024

In September 2024 the Equality and Human Rights Commission issued updated Sexual harassment and harassment at work: technical guidance (EHRC website). This includes disability-related harassment, not just sex-related.

For the status of technical guidance, see Guidance and Codes of Practice: Equality Act 2010>What is technical guidance?

What is ‘harassment’?

The definition in s.26 EqA is wide. A person (A) ‘harasses’ another (B) if A engages in unwanted conduct related to a disability (or another ‘relevant’ protected characteristic) and the conduct has the purpose or effect of –

  • (a) violating B’s dignity, or
  • (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.

Breaking this down, the conduct:

‘Unwanted’

Unwanted means unwanted by the worker (or other claimant). The test is subjective. ‘The Tribunal should ask itself how the worker felt about the conduct and not how a reasonable person would have felt’ (Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131 at §26, citing Windsor Clive Primary School v Fosbrook (bailii.org) [2024] EAT 183, at §38). The EAT in Harkins added:

27. The fact that the test is subjective has a number of consequences:

(1) It will be no answer at this stage of the analysis to say that the worker was over-sensitive;

(2) If the conduct was not in fact unwanted, it does not matter that a reasonable person would not have wanted it;

(3) It is open to the Tribunal to conclude that conduct is unwanted whether or not the worker has ever objected to it, even where it has continued over a period. One of the reasons harassment is so insidious is that its victims often feel under pressure to grin and bear it, even to play up to it, as a self-defensive measure. Harassment is all too easily disguised as ‘banter’ and ‘I was only joking, can’t you take a joke?’ is a stock line in every bully’s repertoire. That is not to say that a lack of objection or participation in an exchange of ‘banter’ is irrelevant, but the relevance is limited to what light it shines upon the true subjective position of the worker.

(4) It is not necessary for the alleged harasser to have appreciated that the conduct was unwelcome.

Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org) [2026] EAT 131, at §27

Although reasonableness is not relevant at this stage, the EAT has pointed out that unless the ‘purpose’ of the conduct is to create the prohibited environment, reasonableness becomes relevant when considering whether the conduct had this ‘effect’ (Windsor Clive Primary School v Fosbrook (bailii.org) [2024] EAT 183, at §38). More on this below: Whether perception of effect was reasonable (oversensitivity).

The meaning of ‘unwanted’ is also discussed in the Employment Code para 7.8, and EHRC Technical guidance 2024 paras 1.8-1.14.

Intimidating etc environment, or violating dignity

The unwanted conduct related to disability (below) must have the purpose or effect of (a) violating another person’s (B’s) dignity, or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.

The question of the alleged harasser’s purpose is a question of fact and must be assessed subjectively (Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131 at §30).

It is a question of fact whether the purpose or effect of conduct falls within (a) or (b), ie is of violating someone’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for them. As discussed below, the EAT has said this wording is intended to cover what one might call ‘serious’ cases.

In Grant v HM Land Registry (bailii.org) [2011] EWCA Civ 769, the claimant was a homosexual male. He had made his homosexuality known to colleagues at the Land Registry office where he previously worked, at which there were over 300 employees. After he was promoted to a different office, a female colleague hinted to the claimant’s female line manager that she thought the claimant was very pleasant. His line manager responded ‘Don’t go fluttering your eye lashes at him, he’s gay.’ The Court of Appeal held that this was not harassment of the claimant:

47. ….even if in fact the disclosure was unwanted, and the claimant was upset by it, the effect cannot amount to a violation of dignity, nor can it properly be described as creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment. The claimant was no doubt upset that he could not release the information in his own way, but that is far from attracting the epithets required to constitute harassment. In my view, to describe this incident as the Tribunal did as subjecting the claimant to a ‘humiliating environment’ when he heard of it some months later is a distortion of language which brings discrimination law into disrepute.

Note: The Court of Appeal said it would not be open to a tribunal to conclude that the incident was harassment. This effectively means it was clearly not harassment.

Discussing this passage, the EAT in Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131, at §31, said the statutory language is pitched at a level that suggests that it is intended to cover what one might call ‘serious’ cases. The EAT said that:

  • having one’s dignity violated smacks of something more than merely being embarrassed or being legitimately upset, and
  • intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive are all terms that connote something more than discomfort, even where it is genuine and understandable.

The Harkins EAT said that the Court of Appeal in the Grant v HM Land Registry passage quoted above should not be understood as excluding only acts that were trivial, or upsets that were minor. This view was consistent with the later case of Pemberton v Inwood (bailii.org) [2018] EWCA Civ 564 at §89, where the fact that the conduct complained of had been ‘profoundly upsetting’ for the claimant did not mean that his dignity had been violated, at least in the particular circumstances of that case.

Para 1.30-1.32 of the EHRC Technical guidance (reflecting Weeks v Newham College of Further Education (bailii.org), EAT, 2012 at §21) say that creating a particular ‘environment’ – meaning here a ‘state of affairs’ – implies a more enduring effect than violating the person’s dignity. The latter may be just in the moment. Even so, effects of even a single act may last longer so as to create an ‘environment’:

Example: If a colleague has made fun of one’s stammer, this may potentially create an intimidating or degrading environment whenever the colleague is present, so that one tries to avoid stammering openly.

A serious one-off incident can amount to harassment (Employment Code para 7.8).

An example of a tribunal case where an employer was held liable for abuse and taunting by colleagues relating to a stammer is B v John Edward Crowther Ltd, 2002. See further below Tribunal cases on harassment about stammering.

Whether perception of effect was reasonable (oversensitivity)

If the purpose of unwanted conduct related to disability was to violate the claimant’s dignity, or to create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant, that is sufficient to establish unlawful harassment.

What if that was not the purpose, but the claimant says it was the effect of the conduct? Here the employer has some protection against a claimant who may be ‘oversensitive’. S.26(4) EqA says that in deciding whether conduct has the effect of violating the person’s dignity or creating an intimidating etc environment, the tribunal must take into account:

  • (a) the perception of the claimant,
  • (b) the other circumstances of the case, and
  • (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

The EAT has interpreted s.26(4) to mean that the conduct is not harassment unless the employment tribunal decides it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. Reasonableness within s.26(4)(c) is not just one factor to be weighed against (a) and (b) (Ahmed v Cardinal Hume Academies (bailii.org) 2019, at §39, applying Pemberton). A 2026 EAT decision considered that there are ‘in overview, two substantive stages’ to the tribunal’s enquiry:

  • First, did the claimant in fact subjectively perceive the conduct as having the effect of violating their dignity or creating an intimidating etc environment?
  • If so, then is it, objectively, reasonable to regard the conduct as having that effect, in all the relevant circumstances of the case?
    (McManus v British Airways (bailii.org) [2026] EAT 155, at §30)

The law seeks to strike a balance. A 2024 EAT decision summarised the position:

14 …. Employees can be expected to demonstrate a degree of robustness …
17 … Employers and employees can be expected to take greater care in how they speak and behave at work than they might in their social life. While it is in no-one’s interest that colleagues should constantly be walking on egg-shells, it is also important that proper protection is provided against violation of dignity at work.
Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire (bailii.org) [2024] EAT 169. Emphasis by me.

The EAT in Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131, at §36 & §39, said that a claimant’s mental ill health can be relevant in assessing what degree of robustness may be reasonably expected. An employee known by an employer to have, say, an anxiety disorder or PTSD, may need to be dealt with in a manner characterised by a greater degree of sensitivity and care. But there must be a limit. It cannot have been the intention of Parliament to make it impossible for an employer to discuss performance concerns, for example. There is a balance to be struck in determining what is reasonable. See too McManus v British Airways (bailii.org) [2026] EAT 155, at §§37-38 & §46.

More generally, the EAT in Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131, at §§36-40 discussed two particular contexts in which allegations of harassment most commonly arise:

  • Where a worker is unhappy with the manner in which the worker is managed: The EAT said a worker might very well find criticism upsetting, but it would be difficult for an employment relationship to function if an employer could not, in a proportionate manner, draw to the attention of an employee good faith concerns about their work, even if these ‘relate to’ disability for example. There is more on what the EAT said here, including examples, below at Where may managing performance in job become ‘harassment’?
  • Interactions with colleagues: The Harkins EAT said there would ordinarily need to be something more than mere reference to a worker’s protected characteristic: ‘If, for instance, a worker had made it clear that it was a matter that they were particularly sensitive about and would prefer was not referred to, or if the reference was disparaging or mocking, or if the colleague was otherwise inappropriately intrusive or insensitive.’

A 2026 case on an OH assessment also illustrates the courts’ concern to set limits on harassment:

McManus v British Airways (bailii.org) [2026] EAT 155
An employment tribunal (ET) held that there was no disability-related harassment by an occupational health advisor in an OH assessment. The claimant was disabled by reason of depression, anxiety and social phobia. The ET had evidence that she ‘was in tears and very distressed during the meeting’.

The ET said the fact that a comment or question (eg had she tried to commit suicide) may have a medical basis was ‘not to be taken as a free pass for the clinician to ask questions in as offensive a manner as possible’. But difficult questions could properly be asked without amounting to disability-related harassment. Also the ET was reluctant to elevate a ‘bedside manner’ of the OH advisor that the subject found objectionable into a matter of disability-related harassment. ‘Some clinicians will be more brisk or direct than others.’

The appeal to the EAT related only to one statement by the OH advisor, namely that Access to Work is ‘not for people like you, it’s for people in wheelchairs’. The ET had said this was essentially the OH advisor getting the remit of Access to Work wrong, but it was going to far to say that it created a hostile etc environment. The EAT held that the ET was entitled to reach the decision it did, even taking into account the claimant’s mental health disability (above).

From an old DDA Code of Practice:

‘A man with a stammer feels he is being harassed because his manager makes constant jokes about people with speech impairments. He asks his manager to stop doing this, but the manager says he is being ‘oversensitive’ as he habitually makes jokes in the office about many different sorts of people. This is likely to amount to harassment because making remarks of this kind should reasonably be considered as having either of the effects mentioned above [ie violating the worker’s dignity or creating a degrading etc environment for him].’

2004 Code of Practice: Employment and Occupation (pdf, archive of Disability Rights Commission website). Para. 4.39. This is no longer a statutory Code of Practice, and it related to the DDA 1995. However, the present position should be the same.

Would it be reasonable to regard a colleague saying ‘Did I stutter?‘ as creating a degrading or offensive etc environment within s.26 EqA?

There is no clear answer. It will depend on the tribunal applying the tests above, which (assuming the purpose is not to create an offensive etc environment) will include taking the relevant circumstances into account. However it should be easier to argue it is unlawful harassment if one has made clear to the colleague that one finds it offensive, especially if the phrase is used repeatedly.

See Getting rid of ‘Did I stutter?’ (stamma.org) 2022, and Interactions with colleagues above.

This area is discussed in the Employment Code paras 7.17 to 7.19, and in para 1.28 of the EHRC’s Technical guidance on harassment, 2024.

To be harassment under s.26 EqA, the conduct must be ‘related to’ disability (or to another protected characteristic listed in s.26(5) EqA).

Accordingly it is not enough for the conduct to be offensive etc, or even extremely offensive. The EAT has said that s.26 EqA:

‘… does not bite on conduct which, though it may be unwanted and have the proscribed purpose or effect, is not properly found for some identifiable reason also to have been related to the [protected] characteristic…, no matter how offensive or otherwise inappropriate the Tribunal may consider it to be’. Whether the conduct is related to a protected characteristic is ‘a matter for the appreciation of the Tribunal, making a finding of fact drawing on all the evidence before it and its other findings of fact’.
Tees Esk Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust v Aslam (bailii.org), EAT, 2019

The EAT in Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131 at §29 adopted the suggestion in Carozzi below that ‘the term “related to” is designed to cover all forms of conduct that, properly viewed, [have] a relationship to the protected characteristic’. 

Clearly the claimant’s view (of whether conduct is related to disability) is not conclusive. In a marginal case, it is likely to be largely a matter for the employment tribunal, whose decision on it cannot normally be appealed to the EAT unless the tribunal has misunderstood the legal test.

‘Related to’ is wider than ‘because of’ (below Technical note: ‘Related to’ is wider than ‘because of’). ‘Because of’ – used in the test for direct discrimination – normally depends on whether the conduct was motivated by the protected characteristic, looking at the alleged perpetrator’s thought processes, as discussed in Direct discrimination>’Because of’ disability. Conduct motivated by disability should be ‘related to’ disability, but conduct can also be related to disability even though not motivated by it.

For example, the EAT in Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire (bailii.org) [2024] EAT 169, at §24, said that being ‘because of’ a protected characteristic was not the only way conduct could be ‘related to’ a protected characteristic. At §25 it gave the example of a person who unknowingly uses a word that is offensive to people who have a protected characteristic, because it is historically linked to oppression of people with that characteristic. The fact that the speaker did not know that the word had such a meaning or connotation, would not prevent it from being ‘related to’ the characteristic. However there would still be the question whether it violated the claimant’s dignity or created an offensive etc environment, including whether it was reasonable to regard it as having that effect: above Whether perception of effect was reasonable (oversensitivity).

The facts of Carozzi are summarised below, as is an older DDA case Prospects for People with Learning Difficulties v Harris. Both relate to performance at work.

Comments or other conduct which refer to a person’s stammer will presumably be ‘related to’ their stammer. Comments or other conduct referring to a person’s speech but not specifically to their stammer, may quite possibly be related to the stammer, depending on the circumstances. The Employment Code para 7.10 says:

‘Protection from harassment also applies where a person is generally abusive to other workers but, in relation to a particular worker, the form of the unwanted conduct is determined by that worker’s protected characteristic.’

Case study: It should not be difficult for a present-day employment tribunal, under s.26 EqA, to find that comments and behaviour such as those in B v John Edward Crowther Ltd, below, 2002, were ‘related to’ the stammer – depending on the facts of course. The comments/behaviour in that case included laughing and pulling faces at the claimant (he sometimes contorted his face trying to get words out); making grunting sounds when he was in the vicinity; an operative said, for example, ‘why don’t you do us all a favour and f**k off you stuttering twat’.

The Employment Code at para 7.10 gives other examples of how it considers the words ‘related to’ apply. So does the EHRC’s Technical guidance on harassment, 2024, from para 1.15.

Does perpetrator need to know of the disability?

There are indications that the perpetrator does not need to know of the disability, but this is not yet clear:

Hagi v Royal Mail (gov.uk), Employment Tribunal, 2023
The claimant had schizophrenia and other conditions. Staff were normally not allowed to have bags in the work area. However, because of her medical condition, the claimant needed the medications and water in her bag. She therefore obtained permission from her line manager to keep her bag in an out-of-the-way place, in the work area.

Another manager, who did not know of her disability, asked her to remove the bag. She refused, saying she had permission for it. The manager began to move towards the bag as if to open it, or to move it himself. The tribunal said this was insensitive in the circumstances. Things got heated between the claimant and manager.

The tribunal upheld her claim for disability-related harassment under the EqA. It was reasonable for the claimant to get upset in the circumstances because, unlike on previous occasions when she was challenged by her line manager, she had by this time provided medical evidence of her need for the bag and sought specific permission to keep it where it was. The other manager did not know that the claimant was disabled, or that the bag contained items related to her disability. The tribunal did not consider this prevented his conduct from being disability-related, because the reason why she had the bag and what it contained was disability-related.

Note: This is not an appeal case, so not a binding precedent.

Harassment related to someone else’s disability

Harassment can relate to someone else’s disability. The EU Court of Justice decided this in Coleman v Attridge Law, 2008. For example, harassment could relate to the stammer of a friend or colleague, or of one’s child. In s.26(1) EqA 2010, the phrase ‘related to a relevant protected characteristic’ is designed to reflect this; contrast that with s.3B(1) DDA 1995 according to which (until re-interpreted following the Coleman case) the disability had to be that of the person claiming harassment. More on harassment because of association…

It seems that the harassment need not be directed at the person making the claim. The Employment Code at para 7.10 gives the example of a manager who racially abuses a black worker. The Code says the black worker’s white colleague could bring a claim of racial harassment if the white colleague is offended as a result of the racial abuse. The EHRC’s Technical guidance on harassment, 2024, at para 1.16 takes a similar approach. By analogy, it seems a worker could claim if offended by abusive remarks made against a colleague who stammers.

Perceived disability, or no disability

Harassment can probably ‘relate to’ disability without there being any actual disability:

  • It seems that harassment of someone who is ‘perceived’ by their employer or work colleagues to have a disability can be unlawful even though in fact there is no disability as legally defined (more on ‘perceived’ disability).
  • It seems too that harassment can be related to disability and illegal even if there is no disability actual or perceived (more on no disability, actual or perceived). This has been considered in relation to sexual orientation:

English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd (bailii.org), Court of Appeal, [2008] EWCA Civ 1421
The claimant alleged that he had been subjected to banter and innuendo of a homophobic nature. Everyone knew he was not homosexual. The Court of Appeal held this could be harassment.

This and other examples are given in the EHRC’s Technical guidance on harassment, 2024, at para 1.16.

On a claim for harassment, the claimant might consider whether, in the alternative, to claim ‘perceived disability’, and/or that the harassment related to ‘disability’ even though there was none perceived – in addition to arguing that the claimant actually has a disability.

Where may managing performance in job become ‘harassment’?

The main limiting factor here is that conduct is not ‘harassment’ unless it was reasonable for it to have the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment (assuming this was not the purpose of the conduct): above Whether perception of effect was reasonable. Also the conduct must be related to disability (above).

As regards how someone is managed, what conduct can reasonably be regarded as having that effect was discussed in Harkins v Marks & Spencer (bailii.org), [2026] EAT 131, at §§38-39. The EAT said a worker might very well find criticism upsetting. But it would be difficult for an employment relationship to function if an employer could not, in a proportionate manner, draw to the attention of an employee good faith concerns about their work, even if these ‘relate to’ a protected characteristic. For example, if an employee’s disability is impacting their performance at work, an employer must be able to understand the difficulty and address the possibility of reasonable adjustments, without it being harassment to raise the topic. However, examples where there might be harassment include:

  • where the manager has confected the supposed concerns, or
  • where the manner in which they are addressed is disproportionate, such as
    • criticising a worker in front of colleagues when it would have been possible to do so in private,
    • communicating concerns in an unnecessarily aggressive, disrespectful or insensitive manner, or
    • raising the concern relentlessly so that a worker is constantly picked on.

McManus v British Airways (above) [2026] EAT 155 held that on the facts an OH advisor’s comments and questions during an OH assessment were not disability-related harassment.

In Carozzi the only issue the EAT had to decide was whether comments by an managers on the worker’s performance ‘related to’ a protected characteristic:

Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire (bailii.org) [2024] EAT 169
This was a racial harassment claim. At least according to the employer, managers were simply expressing concerns that the claimant’s accent was difficult to understand. This was important given her communications role.

The EAT did not decide whether there was harassment. It just decided that the employment tribunal had applied the wrong test when deciding that the employer’s conduct was not ‘related to’ her race. The tribunal had been wrong to ask itself simply whether the employer’s comments were motivated by her race. ‘Related to’ was wider than that. The EAT remitted the case to a fresh tribunal to decide.

In an old case under the Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA), the EAT said that suspension on full pay would not amount to harassment in the generality of cases, but the employment tribunal was entitled to find it amounted to harassment here:

Prospects for People with Learning Difficulties v Harris (bailii.org), EAT, 2012
The claimant had a disability which limited her strength, capacity for manual handling and dexterity. However, she cared for her children and elderly mother, and did housework and shopping. She was employed as a carer for people with severe disabilities. Her employer knew she could not undertake cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), heavy lifting, and many manual tasks, but had continued to employ her.

She was expected to have a first-aid certificate. The trainer’s requirements for this certificate changed, so as to require the person to demonstrate CPR. When her certificate came up for renewal, her employer sent her on the course despite knowing she could not do CPR. When she was refused a certificate, the employer suspended her on full pay, with no prior discussion. The employer said it was because of concerns of safety due to the CPR. After being put into a supernumerary role, then suspended again, she was dismissed on the ground of her inability to conduct CPR and severe limitations on manual handling.

The employment tribunal (ET) held that the dismissal was unfair (procedurally), but was not unlawful disability discrimination. The employer needed to provide staff who were able to assist its residents in an emergency. No adjustments proposed could have allowed the claimant to continue in her role as a support worker. Even so, the ET held that the two suspensions were unlawful as disability-related harassment, violating the claimant’s dignity.

As to the first suspension, for example, the claimant had been suspended simply because of the consequence of a disability of which her line manager had known for something approaching a year. They had known for at least four months that she did not have a first aid certificate, and should have known she was extremely unlikely to be able to get one. The suspension had been without any prior discussion or consultation with her, and apparently without any consideration of whether there was any other task in which she could be employed. [§19]

The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) upheld the ET decision. The EAT said that where an employer acts reasonably in imposing suspension with pay, it will not be harassment. ‘In the generality of cases, suspension on full pay will not amount to harassment.’ However, the ET was entitled to find that the suspension imposed in this case was far removed from that.

Summary and comment: Prospects for People with Learning Difficulties v Harris UKEAT/0612/11 (spencerkeen.co.uk). Note: The suspension was probably not ‘because of’ her disability so as to be direct discrimination. It seems to have been because of her abilities as affected by the disability, rather than because of the disability itself.

Technical note: That Harris case was decided under the DDA at a time when – even before the EqA came into force – disability harassment allowed a looser connection than ‘on the grounds of’/’because of’. From 2003, the DDA s.3B(1) said the harassment must be ‘for a reason which relates to’ the person’s disability. ‘Related to’ (below), in the EqA 2010, is arguably even wider than that DDA wording.

Tribunal cases on harassment about stammering

B v John Edward Crowther Ltd, Employment Tribunal, 2002
A dyehouse worker suffered ongoing abuse from colleagues related to his stammer. They often laughed and pulled faces at him (he sometimes contorted his face trying to get words out). They made grunting sounds when he was in the vicinity. An operative said for example: ‘why don’t you do us all a favour and f**k off you stuttering twat’. The tribunal held the employer was liable for discrimination.

At that time there was not a separate claim for harassment. Nowadays the employer would very likely be liable for harassment under s.26 EqA: cf above Case study.

Also prior to the specific rules on harassment, a claim for harassment/verbal bullying of a person who stammers failed in A v Walkers Snack Foods, 2001. On the evidence the tribunal considered there had been no harassment.

Harassment by colleagues: liability of the employer

An employer is often liable for harassment by a worker’s colleagues, as well as by managers. The main requirement is that the perpetrator was acting ‘in the course of employment’. See my page Who is liable under the Equality Act?

B v John Edward Crowther Ltd (above) is a case on stammering in which the employer was held liable for abuse by work colleagues.

Even if an event at which harassment occurs is outside the office, it may be ‘in the course of employment’, so that the employer is liable: see Who is liable under the Equality Act?>Can include discrimination outside work: ‘in the course of employment’

The phrase ‘in the course of employment’ has a wide meaning: it includes acts in the workplace and may also extend to circumstances outside such as work-related social functions or business trips abroad. For example, an employer could be liable for an act of discrimination which took place during a social event organised by the employer, such as an after-work drinks party.

Employment Code, para 10.46. See also the EHRC’s Technical guidance on harassment, 2024 at para 3.47-3.48, including examples.

The EHRC’s Technical guidance on harassment, 2024, at para 3.87-3.88 points out that an employer should still take reasonable steps to deal with a complaint of harassment by one worker against another committed outside the course of employment, because of some of the principles discussed on Harassment by third parties. Para 3.88 says: ‘… the employer could potentially be liable for direct or indirect discrimination, constructive dismissal or breach of the PSED.’

Harassment by third parties, such as customers or suppliers

Protection for this is much improved from 30th October 2026. See the separate page Harassment by third parties.

Relationship of EqA harassment with direct discrimination and victimisation

See Harassment>Technical note: Relationship of harassment with direct discrimination and victimisation.

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA)

The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (legislation.gov.uk) applies whether or not you have a disability, and is not limited to employment (below). It says that a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to the harassment of another, and which the person knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. ‘Conduct’ includes speech.

The PHA was originally intended to deter stalkers. However, it is now used too for workplace situations. It creates a criminal offence, but the victim can also claim damages in the civil courts for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment, or financial loss resulting from it.

Importantly in a work context, the House of Lords has held that a ‘blameless’ employer can be liable for bullying of one employee by another, if the harassment was closely connected with the bully’s ordinary work duties. See Law lords give bullied workers wider scope to sue employers (theguardian.com), and the full House of Lords judgment at Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust (bailii.org) [2006] UKHL 34. There are also later cases, which I won’t go into, on what is required to satisfy this common law ‘close connection’ test.

Two limitations of harassment under the PHA are that:

  • ‘course of conduct’ must involve conduct on at least two occasions; and
  • because it is also a criminal offence, the harassment must be serious enough to be potentially criminal.

On the harassment being serious enough, the Court of Appeal has said:

‘….it seems to me that, since Majrowski, courts have been enjoined to consider whether the conduct complained of is ‘oppressive and unacceptable’ as opposed to merely unattractive, unreasonable or regrettable. The primary focus is on whether the conduct is oppressive and unacceptable, albeit the court must keep in mind that it must be of an order which “would sustain criminal liability”.’
Veakins v Keir Islington Ltd (bailii.org), 2009.

In para 44 of its decision in Hayden v Dickenson (bailii.org), 2020, the High Court set out 12 principles it had extracted from the case law on PHA harassment.

A claim under the PHA must be brought within six years. This period (the ‘limitation period’) is much longer than the six months time limit (from 1 October 2026) for a harassment claim under the EqA. Where there is a course of conduct involving several incidents, it would have to be considered when the time limit runs from.

The Chop the Knot blog at choptheknot.wordpress.com has posts on the PHA and includes a specific page ‘Harassment damages‘ on levels of compensation under it. This blog was by the late Nick Hanning, who acted for the successful claimant in the Majrowski case above.

Not limited to employment

Harassment under the PHA is of course not limited to harassment by an employer or by colleagues. For example, it could include:

  • harassment at work by customers or suppliers (Harassment by third parties),
  • harassment completely outside the workplace, eg when one goes into a particular shop or cafe – if it happens on more than one occasion (The PHA would apply even to harassment by a customer rather than staff, though then it is the customer rather than staff who would presumably be liable), or
  • harassment by a neighbour.

Other criminal offences

Apart from the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 above (which creates a criminal offence as well as a civil claim), harassment or abuse can sometimes be a criminal offence under other rules. Also, disability-related hostility is a factor which aggravates a criminal office. See Disability hate crimes.

What to do about bullying and harassment

Links:

Also Chapter 4 of EHRCs Technical guidance on harassment updated 2024 deals at length with employers taking steps to prevent and respond to harassment.

From the Employment Code, para 17.92:
An employer has a procedure that allows a grievance relating to harassment to be raised with a designated experienced manager. This avoids the possibility of an allegation of harassment having to be raised with a line manager who may be the perpetrator of the harassment.

See also para 4.51 of the EHRCs Technical guidance on harassment 2024, on employers defining multiple reporting channels to ensure that a worker is not required to report an incident to the perpetrator or someone who they may feel will not be objective.

Technical note: ‘Related to’ is wider than ‘because of’

The Court of Appeal in Unite the Union v Nailard acknowledged that ‘related to’ in the definition of harassment is intended to be wider than ‘on the grounds of’. ‘On the grounds of’ in pre-EqA legislation meant the same as ‘because of’ now does in the EqA, in the test for direct discrimination: Direct discrimination>’Because of’ disability. As discussed at that link, the ‘because of’ test usually depends on the ‘motivation’ of the employer, ie the thought processes of the decision-maker. So as regards harassment, conduct motivated by disability should be seen ‘related to’ disability – but motivation is not the only way in which conduct may be related to disability.

At one time, for most protected characteristics (though not disability: see note below the Harris case above), to qualify as harassment the conduct had to be ‘on the grounds of’ the protected characteristic. As outlined in the previous paragraph, this normally meant the conduct had to be motivated by the protected characteristic (subject to the point below in Nailard). However in 2007 the High Court held that ‘on the grounds of’ was not wide enough to comply with EU law on harassment, so the wording was changed to ‘related to’ – see the Nailard link below.

The Court of Appeal has since suggested – but did not have to decide – that words motivated by something else but referring to the protected characteristic (eg disability) could still be covered as harassment even if the test were whether conduct was ‘on the grounds of’ (or ‘because of’) the protected characteristic: Unite v Union v Nailard: Whether liability for failure to prevent harassment was a breach of the Equality Act. The reason for the act could be the subjective motivation of the perpetrator, but could alternatively be inherent in the act itself. For example, ‘where a speaker uses overtly sexist language, the link with the protected characteristic is in the words themselves and does not depend on his motivation’.

25th anniversary of stammeringlaw, 1999-2024